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1. Introduction 
Global concern about food security has prompted a focus on increasing productivity 
using increasingly scarce resources. In Australia, as in many countries, a growing 
population and the projected effects of climate change and shift mean that water is the 
focus of much of this concern. However, as in many other established economies the 
infrastructure designed to move water from relatively water-abundant areas to provide 
irrigation is aging. It requires significant investment to guard against its failure, to ensure 
it meets modern standards of safety, and to ensure that water is productively used and 
that wastage is minimised.  
In accordance with the dominant global view that prioritises free trade, to which Australia 
subscribes, competition policy prescribes that irrigation infrastructure is provided on a ‘user 
pays’ basis – the cost of infrastructure is factored in to the cost of the water. In northern 
Victorian irrigation regions, where this policy has been aggressively implemented, water 
costs have been ‘unbundled’ to reflect usage, maintenance, service and infrastructure costs, 
so that the usage component does not form a significant part of the total water charge. In 
such an environment, the major infrastructure investment needed to renew irrigation 
infrastructure cannot be provided directly by irrigators.  
The question of investment in irrigation infrastructure is common to many developed 
countries. In the arid states of the United States, which followed a similar ‘nation-building’ 
path in the funding of irrigation infrastructure (Lampen, 1930; Newell, 1903) irrigation 
infrastructure is in poor condition (US water infrastructure needs seen as urgent, 2009). 
Building irrigation capacity in developing countries has been identified as a priority, and 
major irrigation schemes are being built in China and India. However, the optimal model of 
investment and ownership of infrastructure is still a matter for significant debate (Abbot 
and Cohen, 2009). This is of particular significance when returns on commodities are subject 
to market distortions, so that irrigators paying for irrigation infrastructure will be competing 
with irrigators who are not. 
The situation in Australia is of significance to any region seeking to optimise water capture 
and extraction for irrigation purposes. It is not clear how the current round of irrigation 
industry reforms will affect the industries and communities reliant on irrigation; the context, 
background and effects of those reforms should be closely considered. 
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This chapter will critically analyse irrigation industry reforms in northern Victoria, 
Australia. Irrigation in this region is undergoing significant organisational and 
infrastructure reform. With extensive assets, increasing conveyance costs and competing 
demands for water, managers of irrigation businesses have implemented far-reaching 
changes which will have flow-on effects for irrigation customers.  
The social, political and legal context of these reforms is significant, so this account will 
commence with consideration of the national cooperative agreement that water should be 
managed according to the national competition agenda, the corporatisation of water 
authorities, the implementation of ‘user-pays’ principles and unbundled water charges, and 
the development of trade in water. Subsequent pressures as a consequence of a major 
drought have brought into sharp focus the environmental impact of water extractions. 
Market mechanisms, along with direct government acquisition of water entitlements have 
been directed towards reducing the irrigation ‘take’ from the Murray Darling system. As a 
consequence, in northern Victoria, modernisation, rationalisation and reconfiguration 
projects have been developed. These are aimed at reducing irrigation water use and 
contracting the coverage of irrigation infrastructure. This chapter will consider the 
modernisation process in northern Victoria. It will consider the implementation of a 
‘backbone’ set of water conveyances, selected on the basis of water usage, and ‘connection’ 
back to that conveyance of channels and ‘nibs’. The processes by which the ‘backbone’ was 
identified, the impact of that decision on irrigators, and the negotiation of the ‘connections’ 
program will require consideration of the formation of irrigator syndicates, the privatisation 
of irrigation infrastructure, and vexed questions regarding liability for failed assets, 
particularly on public roads and crown land. The reality of postulated water ‘savings’ has 
become a matter for political debate, and the economic and social consequences of the 
modernisation project have been matters of concern. 
2. Irrigation policy drivers in Australia 
Irrigation policy in Australia is driven by competing environmental and agricultural water 
needs, the cross-party acceptance of a market driven National Competition Policy 
(http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/), and increasing infrastructure costs as a result of aging 
infrastructure and increased engineering and safety requirements. These drivers impact at 
different levels and to different extents, and can, as will be seen, be derailed by short-term 
populism. 
The irrigation policy environment, particularly in Victoria, has been characterised by a series 
of disruptive changes since the mid-1980s. These have delivered changes in governance, a 
decline in water availability, the introduction of water trading, unbundling of the water 
‘product’ and change in the nature of the water ‘right’ itself.  
2.1 Competition policy reform 
Competition policy reform is expressed in states’ commitment to a national competition 
agenda. The competition framework was endorsed by the Council of Australian 
Government (CoAG), made up of the Commonwealth and State Governments. In relation  
to water, the CoAG, an Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative 
between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Governments of New South Wales,  
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Policy driver Date Primary focus 
Water (Central 
Management 
Restructuring) Act 
(Vic). 
1984 Replacement of State Rivers and Water Supply Commission 
with Rural Water Commission 
Water Act (Vic) 1989 Introduced water trading 
  Conversion to Bulk Entitlements 
Water (Rural Water 
Corporation) Act (Vic).
1992 Corporatisation of Victorian water authorities 
CoAG National Water 
Initiative 
1995 Market principles increasingly applied to water 
Murray Darling Basin 
Commission Cap 
1997 Diversions from the Murray Darling Basin capped at 1993-94 
levels. 
Essential Services 
Commission Act (Vic) 
2001 Regulation of rural water providers through the Essential 
Services Commission – introduction of a process to regulate 
water prices on the basis of cost recovery 
Water (Resource 
Management) Act (Vic)
2005 Unbundling of water ‘product’ in Goulburn-Murray Water 
area - existing water rights are converted into water shares, 
delivery rights and water-use licences; separation of water 
from land; creation of water share register 
Water (Governance) 
Act (Vic) 
2006 Mirroring of corporate principles in water governance 
Water Act (Cth) 2007 Federalisation of water resource management; Formulation of 
Basin Plan 
Table 1. summary of market based policy drivers 
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory (CoAG, 1995) operates on the premise that national productivity will be improved 
by the marketisation of water resources.  
The adoption of market principles is broadly consistent with view across a number of 
developed nations that the state provision of services is marred by state failure. State-owned 
enterprises were targeted for reform taking a number of forms, including structural change by 
unbundling activities currently provided by monopoly bodies; commercialization, by 
requiring that an enterprise market its services on a commercial basis to achieve at least cost 
recovery; contracting out of functions; corporatization to establish the body on a fully 
commercial basis but as a state owned company, with a delineation of the roles of the 
Government and the entity; and privatization of the government owned business, either 
wholly or partly (Department of the Treasury, 1993). 
In the United Kingdom privatization of water resources occurred under the Conservative 
Government in 1989, representing the largest and highest level of privatization in the world. 
Privatization has also occurred in the United States (Water Science and Technology Board, 
2002). This prevalence of the view that the adoption of market principles in the provision of 
government services is a good thing takes in ‘a number of strands of economic thinking … 
claims about the nature of organizational functioning and public policy-making’ (Walsh, 1995: 
15) and the ‘ineffective’ and ‘inherently wasteful’ institutional framework implementing state 
activity and policy (Walsh, 1995: 15). Pusey notes the tendency of the dominant view to ‘see 
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the world in terms that neutralize and then reduce the norms of public policy to those of 
private enterprise’ (Pusey, 1991: 8).  
In Victoria there is a continuing reluctance to privatise water itself. The potential for a 
political backlash if such an attempt was made was recognised by the Victorian Parliament 
itself, when the Victorian Constitution was amended to prevent privatization of Victorian 
water authorities. The Constitution (Water Authorities) Act 2003 (Vic) entrenches the 
responsibility of public authorities to continue to deliver water by the insertion of a new 
Part VII in the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic). Section 97(1) states that if at any time on or after 
the commencement of section 5 of the Constitution (Water Authorities) Act 2003 a public 
authority has responsibility for ensuring the delivery of a water service, that or another 
public authority must continue to have that responsibility. However, the section does not 
prevent the authority from contracting with another regarding the service, whilst retaining 
responsibility for it, and this has been a dominant mechanism in the provision of water 
services in Victoria.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Primary case study area 
The situation in Victoria is a case study for the potential effects of irrigation trade in a 
geographically extensive, arid, aging, largely user-pays system. The area managed by 
Goulburn-Murray Water (http://www.g-mwater.com.au/about/regionalmap), is comprised 
of gravity irrigators, pumped irrigation systems, surface water diverters, groundwater 
irrigators, stock and domestic customers, commercial operators (such as tourism operators), 
and bulk water purchasers, such as urban water corporations. 
The facilitation of trade in water in Victoria is a continuation of the National Competition 
Policy, driven by the Productivity Commission, and now overseen by the National Water 
Commission (the NWC), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the 
ACCC) and the Essential Services Commission (the ESC). According to the National Water 
Commission, ‘water trading is a centre piece of national water reform’. 
The development of a national ‘grid’ to enable water trade is presumed to deliver a range of 
benefits: 
Goulburn-Murray Water operates in Victoria, 
Australia, and manages 70% of Victoria’s water 
supplies. It manages water services over 68,000 
square kilometres. Its role is to manage and 
operate an irrigation district, a water district 
and a waterway management district 
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• Enhancing the capacity to ‘adjust’ to changing agricultural circumstances, such as low 
commodity prices; 
• Facilitating land use changes; for instance, purchasing more water to more fully utilise 
land, or selling water and converting to dryland farming; 
• Enabling irrigators to ‘hedge’ against periods of poor rainfall by selling irrigation 
entitlements; for instance, in a period of prolonged drought some irrigators are able to 
convert to non irrigation operations, or to 
• Liberating the embedded capital in a farming enterprise by enabling irrigators to sell or 
secure against their entitlement (separately from land); 
• Enabling the transfer of water to urban use, thus adding economic value to regional 
communities; 
• Improving the efficiency of water use by enabling water delivery to reflect market costs 
and encourage transfer to more efficient uses. 
Water trading in major irrigation regions in Victoria can occur on a permanent or a 
temporary basis, and sophisticated methods have been devised to facilitate its occurrence. 
Water brokerage firms are common, and large water suppliers have user-interface systems 
which allow online trading of water. For instance, Goulburn-Murray Water developed the 
‘Watermove’ web trading interface at www.watermove.com.au. It allows trade in water 
allocation, water shares, groundwater, and unregulated surface water. There is no doubt 
that water trading has, since its inception, provided significant flexibility for irrigators. 
During the recent decade-long drought water trading was particularly beneficial, and 
analysts of the effect of water trading have used these figures to illustrate its positive effect 
(National Water Commission, 2010a). A clear picture of the effects of water trade in an 
individual irrigation area is more problematic; consolidated records provide detailed 
information about the amount of water traded, whether it is permanent or temporary, high 
security or low security water, and the regions from or into which it was traded (National 
Water Commission, 2010b).  
An indicative comparison of water traded in the Goulburn system in the height of the recent 
drought (2007 – 2010 irrigation seasons) demonstrates relatively flat net volumes traded 
(into the irrigation district) but high total volumes traded, demonstrating that water was 
moving between irrigators. It is possible to interpret this as a rational response to water 
shortage by those able to obtain a higher price per megalitre of water by selling it than they 
could by utilising it - particularly since overall water allocations may have been too low to 
continue normal farming operations. The fluctuations in temporary price are more 
indicative of the yield per megalitre of water, since purchase of permanent water in a given 
year would not necessarily deliver a full water allocation in that year. 
Positive messages about the effect of water trade as a comparison to the alternative – water 
attached to land and unable to be traded - display some blindness to the historical position. 
Because of State government policies prior to the marketisation of water, irrigators were 
required to pay for water regardless of whether they received it or not. This was deliberate 
measure to ensure the ongoing viability of the irrigation infrastructure, and a lesson learned 
by government by the failure of private irrigation ventures during years of drought. Prior to 
1986, during years of low allocation, irrigators could receive no water, but still be required 
to pay for that water. Conversely, if they did not need the water, but received an allocation, 
they were obliged to pay for it regardless. Thus, there was no incentive to conserve water, 
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severe impediments to changing land use, and ongoing costs in years of low income. The 
capacity to trade an allocation delivered immediate benefits. Irrigators whose land use was 
constrained by lack of water could improve the productivity of that land by purchasing 
additional water, and farmers who wished to transition out of farming, or transition out of 
irrigation farming, had additional mechanisms with which to do so. 
 
Table 2. Volumes traded in the Goulburn 1A Irrigation Zone.  
However, marketisation of water was accompanied by a number of other mechanisms, 
including the unbundling of the water product into a number of products representing 
separate charges for delivery, infrastructure, and water components. The actual volume of 
water is not a major proportion of the bill. Thus, under the provisions of the Water (Resource 
Management) Act 2005 (Vic), which amends the Water Act 1989 (Vic), existing water rights 
were converted into water shares, delivery rights and water-use licences. The irrigator is 
able to trade the actual water share, but the infrastructure access fee would still be payable, 
unless the irrigator surrenders it. In order to surrender the access fee the irrigator has to pay 
a termination (exit) fee, which can be prohibitively expensive (ACCC, 2009b).  
The purpose of the infrastructure access charges and the termination fees is to ensure the 
viability of the infrastructure in the event of significant numbers of water users exiting the 
water district. The obvious corollary to this is that, contrary to the principle of facilitating 
flexibility in land and water use, holders of large delivery shares are locked into irrigation 
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enterprises. There is the theoretical potential for people to trade the delivery share, however 
there is no market for that component. During the unbundling process irrigators with an 
existing right were given one delivery share for each hundred megalitre of water 
entitlement. However, the delivery share was devalued because irrigators requiring 
temporary water can acquire 270 megalitres on a parcel of land for each delivery share. 
There is, therefore, no market for the sale of delivery shares. 
2.2 Environmental pressures 
The environment is traditionally a matter within state Constitutional competence. State-
based environmental legislation has a significant impact on the delivery of water in rural 
areas. Longstanding environmental measures at state level include those pursuant to the 
Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 (Vic), the Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), the 
Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 (Vic), the Heritage Rivers Act 1992 (Vic) and the Planning 
and Environment Act 1987 (Vic). Environmental requirements also apply under Part 3 of  
the Water Act 1989 (Vic). Coverage by federal legislation has increased as a consequence  
of High Court interpretations of the external affairs power enabled by s.51(xxix) of  
the constitution, but significant co-operative measures had been taken to implement 
desirable environmental measures. In particular, the Murray Darling Basin Commission Cap 
was implemented to restrict diversions to ‘the volume of water that would have been 
diverted under 1993/94 levels of Development. In unregulated rivers this Cap may be 
expressed as an end-of-valley flow regime’ (MDBMC, 1996). The primary objectives of 
implementation were:  
1. to maintain and, where appropriate, improve existing flow regimes in the waterways of 
the Murray-Darling Basin to protect and enhance the riverine environment; and  
2. to achieve sustainable consumptive use by developing and managing Basin water 
resources to meet ecological, commercial and social needs. 
As a consequence of the environmental stresses occasioned by the recent drought there has 
been a wholesale attempt to federalise basin-wide management of the water resource. The 
Water Act 2007 (Cth), partially based on a patchwork of constitutional powers and partially a 
result of negotiations between the Commonwealth and each Basin State, was realised only 
when a drought of over a decade duration began to threaten urban water security. 
However, it had as its fundamental premise the desire to manage the Basin on a global basis, 
and in particular to limit extractions of water, in order to ‘provide for the integrated 
management of the Basin water resources in a way that promotes the objects of [the Water 
Act 2007 (Cth)], in particular by providing for: 
a. Giving effect to relevant international agreements (to the extent to which those 
agreements are relevant to the use and management of the Basin water resources); and 
b. The establishment and enforcement of environmentally sustainable limits on the 
quantities of surface water and ground water that may be taken from the Basin water 
resources (including by interception activities); and 
c. Basin-wide environmental objectives for water-dependent ecosystems of the Murray-
Darling Basin and water quality and salinity objectives; and 
d. Water to reach its most productive use through the development of an efficient water 
trading regime across the Murray-Darling Basin; and 
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e. Requirements that a water resource plan for a water resrouce plan area must meet if it is 
to be accredited or adopted under Division 2; and 
f. Improved water security for all uses [sic] of Basin water resources (Water Act 2007 (Cth) 
s.20). 
The Basin Plan has not yet been released; at the time of writing it had been delayed again 
until October 2011 (Slattery, 2011). Significant controversy has arisen over the appropriate 
balance to be struck between environmental, social and economic values in devising the 
Plan (ABC News 2010; Stubbs, Storer, Lux and Storer 2010). Whether the environment was 
to have priority in the final Basin Plan was a matter of competing legal views. There was a 
real question as to whether the Act required the Authority to privilege the environment over 
other concerns (Kildea and Williams, 2011). There are significant concerns as to whether the 
Authority is the appropriate body to balance social and economic factors with 
environmental concerns. The forwarding of social objectives is more properly left to political 
consideration. The Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (MDBA, 2010a) prioritised the 
environment and required significant cuts to irrigation entitlements, but the negative 
response to the proposed plan (Cooper 2010; Lloyd, 2010a), however, and the return of rain 
(Lloyd 2010b) have delayed the progress of reforms.  
2.3 Regional policy 
Regional policy frequently demands political responses, and the vulnerability of policy-
making which affects rural communities was demonstrated by the political fallout from the 
Guide to the proposed Murray-Darling Basin Plan (MDBA, 2010a). The priority for regional 
policy in Australia has, however, for many years, been the facilitation of ‘sustainable’ or 
‘resilient’ communities, and the ‘adjustment’, with government assistance, of those that 
appear to be unsustainable. The government or quasi-governmental agency enables the 
individual or community to become a self-sufficient agent. Marketisation of water 
infrastructure and water resources is consistent with this view, since it conceptualises the 
individual as capable of utilising transactional mechanisms, such as contract, to achieve 
optimal personal outcomes. Full cost recovery on government supplied infrastructure, such 
as dams and channels, is necessary to ensure that the community is ‘sustainable’. Trade in 
water ensures that water can move from an ‘unsustainable’ community to a sustainable one. 
Analyses of the operation of market mechanisms for water transfer have been characterised 
as supporting this view; the National Water Commission, in a study of the effects of water 
trading in the southern Murray Darling Basin, concluded that ‘water markets and trading 
are making a major contribution to the achievement of the NWI objective of optimising the 
economic, social and environmental value of water. The overwhelming conclusion of the 
study is that water trading has significantly benefited individuals and communities across 
the sMDB’ (NWC, 2010, v). 
The interaction between regional policy and the various water policies, however, is complex, 
particularly where the contraction of essential infrastructure is concerned. The basis upon 
which infrastructure – particularly water infrastructure – is reduced has far-reaching 
consequences for regions, since it affects rural rate bases, school and hospital viability, and a 
range of other service that depend on population density. The contraction of water 
infrastructure in the northern Victorian irrigation regions is driven by the decision that the 
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infrastructure is unsustainably expensive on a user-pays basis. As a generalisation this is 
problematic; there are elements of cross-subsidisation across irrigation districts in the larger 
water suppliers. Like all organisations the depreciation of infrastructure and the allocation 
of maintenance costs make a significant difference to whether the area is operating at a loss. 
Overall, the entirety of Goulburn-Murray Water is required to operate on a full-cost 
recovery basis (Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, 2007 - 2008). 
However, one of the consequences of modernisation of infrastructure will be an increase in 
the cost of that infrastructure for users on an ongoing basis. 
3. Political, and environmental stressors 
3.1 Water scarcity and centralisation of water policy 
Thus, at the commencement of the new millennium Australian water policy was broadly 
consistent. However, the manner by which states implemented that policy, and the degree 
of compliance with key objectives, varied significantly. The more populous states of New 
South Wales and Victoria, with developed irrigation industries and a long history of 
appropriation, do not have the same interests as Queensland, with a shorter history of 
development and greater incentive to continue to allow diversions, or South Australia, with 
a capital city entirely dependent on extraction and a developing horticultural industry. 
Although compliance with national water policy is assessed, and Commonwealth tranche 
payments are dependent on that compliance, states’ ability or willingness to set up the 
appropriate mechanisms has not always been evident. The Commonwealth suspended 
competition payments to SA, Victoria and NSW for not meeting their commitment to enable 
interstate trade in water by the agreed date of July 2006, and subsequently gained in-
principle agreement to enable trade. 
The decade of drought in the 1990s, however, allowed the federal government to assert 
significant political pressure on the states to centralise water resource management in the 
basin more thoroughly. Increasing pressure on urban supplies necessitated massive 
investments in infrastructure to ensure continuing supply of water to major population 
centres. The perennial state shortage of infrastructure funds for the construction of pipelines 
and desalination plants to augment city supplies was answered by federal government 
leverage of funding to obtain agreement to the referral of powers necessary to pass the 
federal Water Act 2007 (Cth). The explanatory memorandum to the Act stated that it gives 
effect to a number of key elements of the Commonwealth Government’s $10.05 billion 
National Plan for Water Security. The Act is intended to enable water resources in the Murray-
Darling Basin to be managed in the national interest, optimising environmental, economic 
and social outcomes. 
The Act was contentious, and subject to constitutional challenge, particularly by the State of 
Victoria, which had initially refused to refer its powers to the Commonwealth. The Act in its 
final form commenced operation on 3 March 2008; however, as stated above, the Basin Plan 
required under the Act has not yet been finalised. 
3.2 State policy and the rush for results 
The availability of federal funding was a significant incentive, particularly for Victoria. 
However, the Victorian government would have suffered political backlash if it had simply 
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built a pipeline from rural water supplies and purchased water to augment urban supplies. 
Instead, it took the opportunity afforded by a proposal by rural interests to ‘save’ water by 
improving rural infrastructure, paying for it with a combination of urban, state and federal 
government money, and splitting the water ‘saved’ between the environment, urban water 
consumers and rural water consumers. Problematically, however, these decisions were 
made under the pressure of a drought, and urban water security, particularly in the capital 
city of Melbourne, was threatened. Thus there was significant pressure to find water 
‘savings’ quickly, and expedite infrastructure development.  
4. The ‘modernisation’ of irrigation infrastructure 
4.1 Water savings and trade-offs 
The major support for funding of infrastructure improvements is through identification of 
water ‘savings’ that can be deployed as environmental water or ‘sold’ to urban use. The 
trade metaphor enables consistency with the market-based premise within which the 
industry operates. Water ‘savings’ are generated through the replacement of meters, 
installation of regulators to enable closer regulation of the channel system to prevent outfall 
and reduce seepage (by running the channel lower) and in some cases through the lining or 
piping of channels. Leaving aside the highly questionable assumption of defective 
Dethridge wheels inevitably measuring in favour of farmers, for which significant savings 
have been claimed, the most significant water savings are generated through the 
privatisation or retirement of irrigation infrastructure. 
The technologies of performance to monitor savings have, unfortunately, been preceded by 
the projects they are meant to be monitoring. Thus, audit of outcomes of the rationalisation 
processes has been performed without baseline data and the protocols for quantification of 
water savings had to be developed after the actions upon which the water savings were 
dependent had been commenced (DSE, 2010). 
An early analysis of the use of water ‘savings’ mechanisms over other techniques was 
carried out by the Productivity Commission, which noted that 
One of the purported benefits of water saving investment over market purchase is that 
it avoids reductions in rural water use by creating ‘new’ water. However, water 
‘savings’ associated with indirect purchases can be illusory. That is, measures to reduce 
system losses actually divert water from other beneficial uses, elsewhere in the system, 
that rely on return flows (PC 2006b). For example, total channel control is a water 
delivery technology that uses automated control gates to reduce irrigation district 
outfalls and improve service quality. However, district outfalls often supply 
downstream water users. Transferring entitlements out of the system based on illusory 
water savings can therefore ‘double up’ losses in return flows (Productivity 
Commission, 2008: 78) 
The Productivity Commission reviewed the operation of the NVIRP alongside other water 
purchase mechanisms to product environmental flows – largely tender mechanisms - in 
2009. However, consistent with the Commission mandate it was predicated on the use of 
market mechanisms to achieve the environmental outcomes and was primarily concerned 
with the interaction of proposed mechanisms (NVIRP, 2009). 
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4.2 Contraction of irrigation infrastructure 
The Northern Victorian Irrigation Renewal Project (NVIRP) is a state-owned entity; the 
Chief Executive Officer reports through the NVIRP Board to the Minister for Water and the 
Treasurer. When the modernisation process is complete the assets constructed will be 
transferred to Goulburn-Murray Water. The aim of the ‘modernisation’ project now being 
implemented by NVIRP is to deliver ‘a more efficient and affordable irrigation delivery 
network that is able to deliver an improved level of water delivery service and increase on-
farm productivity’ (DSE, 2004). Water ‘savings’ to be delivered from this program have been 
estimated as up to 425 GL annually. Of that amount, 75 GL were intended to be diverted to 
Melbourne, 175 allocated to the environment and 175 to irrigators in the system (King and 
Tonkin, 2009). The program was to have been partially funded by Melbourne Water 
premised on the diversion of water to Melbourne, but this was subsequently changed 
(Victoria Auditor General, 2009, vii). The ‘Core Principles’ of NVIRP, espoused by the Food 
Bowl Modernisation Project Steering Committee report and endorsed by the Victorian 
Government on 30 November 2007, are to: 
• Focus on economic development 
• Strive for efficiency in both water supply and farm watering systems 
• Provide different levels of service to meet the needs of different customers and 
customer types 
• Strive for an on-demand water delivery service 
• Develop system components that ensure cost and service competitiveness in water 
supply 
• Develop policies to support and guide decisions 
• Stage project delivery to match funding availability (NVIRP, (nd b)). 
The majority of these principles demonstrate the 
‘post-welfarist regime of the social’ in which ‘performance government’ displaces the 
collectivist ethos of welfarism. Here, various state and non-state agencies become 
facilitators both in optimizing individual capacities to act in an entrepreneurial and 
socially responsible way, and in the diagnosis of potential risks that threaten to disrupt 
the achievement of personal liberty (Higgins and Lockie, 2002, 421).  
The NVIRP not only reconstructs government infrastructure (on a user-pays basis) it will 
facilitate on-farm irrigation works, funding them with water off-sets, to enforce efficiency 
gains. Irrigators will inherit a high-functionality, high-cost irrigation network, and a fully 
marketised water trading system will enable the transfer of water from those unable to 
afford the higher water costs to higher value uses – such as urban use. 
The irrigation area involved in the project is around 800,000 ha and 14,000 farms (Spencer, 
2010: 17), and by any measure the injection of funds into the project is significant. Around $2 
billion is projected to be utilised in the project in replacement of meters, and regulators 
lining channels and implementation of ‘total channel control’ systems. ‘Total Channel 
Control’ is a Rubicon Systems product aiming for ‘end-to-end irrigation canal automation 
technology ...[and] transforming the inefficient manually operated open canal networks into 
fully automated, integrated and remotely controlled systems that are achieving 
demonstrated new benchmark delivery efficiencies of up to 90%’ (Spencer, 2010, 19). The 
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90% efficiency claim is substantiated by a reference to the Coleambally Irrigation district 
during the 2006-07 year (a drought year during which irrigators had a 10% irrigation 
allocation in that system) (DEWR, 2007) and refers to the claims that irrigators were 
allocated an extra 18% water allocation because of ‘savings’ from the new system; but it is 
not clear whether this is carryover from the previous year. It is not clear whether the 
‘benchmark’ of 90% is an average or a measure on one channel in the system. It is being 
compared with the 73% average across irrigation systems. Losses will vary according to a 
range of factors including soil type, gradient, supply level and infrastructure age. Further, 
Coleambally was a greenfields site; the infrastructure was installed when the district was 
developed. Thus, it was new infrastructure, and the costs of retrofitting century-old 
infrastructure was not an issue. 
Commentators have lauded the effects of the modernisation; the Business Development 
Manager of Rubicon Systems (which supplies the ‘Flumegates’ and ‘Total Channel Control’ 
mechanisms for the upgraded system), has reported that 
A higher level of technological investment in the modernization of large unlined, 
gravity fed irrigation systems in the south-eastern state of Victoria has resulted in 
increases in efficiency from about 70% up to about 90% - a remarkable outcome. In 
Victoria, the water saved is being reallocated equally between urban and industrial 
users, the environment and to existing farmers to improve their security of supply 
(Spencer, 2010: 15). 
Other commentators have been less laudatory; the cost of the infrastructure program in 
delivering environmental and urban water far exceeds the cost of purchasing the water on the 
market. Some irrigators are concerned not only about the projected contraction of the irrigation 
system, but also about the potentially unsustainable cost of the new technology, which will be 
likely to have a shorter lifespan than previous low-technology solutions such as the Dethridge 
Wheel, and will require them to bear higher ongoing infrastructure charges.  
4.2.1 The backbone 
The most significant factor in generating the savings required by the Northern Victorian 
Irrigation Renewal Program will be the contraction of irrigation infrastructure to the 
‘backbone’. This is the network of channels closest to the main carrier, based on the delivery 
share on that particular channel. Thus, modernisation works are being carried out to service 
those farms on the ‘backbone’. 
The contraction of irrigation infrastructure to the backbone was prefaced in the Victorian 
White Paper: 
Rationalisation of services is primarily an issue for north-central Victoria. Goulburn-
Murray Water and its water service committees realize that some parts of existing 
distribution systems need to be closed down. They were constructed in an era of bold 
development and in some places are just too spread out, as well as being on land that 
has turned out to be unsuited to irrigation (DSE, 2004: 82) 
Rationalisation was originally a separate government program, but it appears that it has 
now been rolled over into the Northern Victorian Irrigation Renewal Program, resulting in 
difficulties ascertaining whether the objectives of either program had been met. 
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Rationalisation of irrigation infrastructure has not been confined to ‘land that has turned out 
to be unsuited to irrigation.’ The first irrigation district to be closed was the Campaspe 
Irrigation District, on excellent land and close to a natural carrier, and, ironically, flooded in 
early 2011 and in the following season water entitled to 100% allocation. The backbone 
becomes the de facto mechanism for limiting public funding of infrastructure. Those on the 
backbone undergo a series of consultation mechanisms to determine their current and future 
business needs – the farm irrigation assessment process – after which a decision is made by 
NVIRP as to their infrastructure requirements to meet those needs. The infrastructure will 
be installed and monetary compensation will be paid on the basis of assets removed. 
Additional programs utilising federal money and handled through the Department of 
Primary Industries finance on-farm efficiency works such as the installation of pipes and 
rises to replace flood irrigation, the piping of on-farm channels, and the laser levelling of 
land in return for the irrigator surrendering water. The agencies are therefore facilitating the 
projected business infrastructure requirements – they have taken on an enabling role, 
brokering deals to increase the efficiency of the irrigation operations of the farm. 
4.2.2 The connection programs 
The primary ‘technology of agency’ is the connections program, pursuant to which 
individuals or groups who are not on the backbone must negotiate either alone or with 
neighbours to connect to the backbone. NVIRP notes that 
NVIRP’s Connections Program involves connecting irrigators to a modernised main 
system of irrigation channels or ‘backbone’. The program aims to consolidate supply 
point connections and ensure as many customers as possible are connected directly to 
the backbone to access improved water delivery services. 
Properties are connected to the Goulburn-Murray Water channel supply system via 
supply point connections. Through the Connections Program, irrigators are being 
encouraged to upgrade their supply point connections or move supply points from 
secondary or spur channels to the backbone via a new connection, adopting the solution 
that best suits their farming operations (NVIRP, nd c). 
This may mean that monetary incentives for connection are available based on water 
savings. Further incentives are available for on-farm efficiency works from programs like 
the Farm Water Program (Goulburn Broken Catchment Management Authority, 2010). 
NVIRP processes are mediated first by negotiation between one or a number of landowners, 
then by contract: a standard Rationalisation Agreement (NVIRP, nd a) forever discharges 
Goulburn-Murray Water and NVIRP ‘from any and all claims and rights for any cost, loss, 
liability, damage, compensation or expense arising out of or in connection with the 
Rationalisation or the matters contemplated by this Agreement’ (NVIRP, nd a: para 8(b)). 
Upon signature, the landowner accepts payment of compensation ‘in full and final 
satisfaction of all claims…in connection with the matters contemplated by the Agreement’ 
(NVIRP, nd a: para 7(b)). 
The overall difficulty with the connections program at this stage, however, is the ongoing 
uncertainty for irrigators who have found themselves off the backbone, even though their 
farming enterprises are otherwise sustainable and profitable. Although the program rollout 
has occurred over a number of years, the lack of detail on the manner in which ‘connections’ 
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to the backbone will occur has been problematic, partly because it introduces the issue of the 
privatisation of infrastructure, and the risks and losses associated with infrastructure. 
4.2.3 Privatisation of risks and losses 
The perennial debate about the efficacy of ‘market’ mechanisms for the delivery of public 
services attracts the usual criticisms of wasteful government service provision (Brody, 2005: 
3). Conversely, critics of market mechanisms as primary devices for delivery of social 
obligations instance failures in the market due to monopolization of private providers, 
failure to provide adequate incentives for delivery of social obligations and rising prices 
after privatisation of government services. Since instances of problematic introduction of 
market mechanisms can be dismissed where benchmarks for successful private delivery 
were insufficiently defined, and since reintroduction of full government provision of many 
services is not on the agenda, the debate must be more strategically defined. 
The connections program brings public infrastructure to a single supply point. Although 
details have not been finally determined, the dominant model has been that water will be 
metered at that point. From that point, infrastructure requirements are privatised. Ongoing 
maintenance of that infrastructure is the obligation of the landowner or group of landowners. 
Additional infrastructure, such as road culverts and bridges, were also anticipated as included 
in private obligations, but local councils have expressed disquiet with that arrangement, and 
refused to accept applications for planning approval, and it has now been indicated that water 
authorities will be required to maintain responsibility for these assets. 
If more than one landowner requires water from that single supply point, the administration 
of water from that supply point is also a matter for private negotiation. These arrangements 
are considered to be primarily of a commercial nature; decisions will be based on the current 
and projected irrigation business needs. This also privatizes losses on the infrastructure 
below the supply point, and enables NVIRP to claim these losses as part of the program 
savings. The expectation appears to be that contractual mechanisms will mediate 
relationships between affected irrigators. 
Those not on the backbone continue to meet the other infrastructure demands of the system. 
Thus, landholders pay delivery share on the basis that they remain connected. Further, 
irrigators will be constrained from ‘exiting’ the system without the requirement to pay an 
exit fee. The ACCC oversees the obligation to pay an exit fee (ACCC, 2009a). The maximum 
termination fee allowed by the ACCC is 10 times the total infrastructure access fee (although 
a common requirement to pay the current year’s infrastructure access fee makes it, in reality, 
11 times that fee), which equates to the amount payable per delivery share. For many 
irrigators of average size, this amount will be in the hundreds of thousands, and it will vary 
between irrigation areas because the cost of maintenance of infrastructure will vary between 
areas. Ironically, those areas which have been most extensively modernised and thus have 
the most expensive infrastructure may also have the highest ongoing costs, and thus be the 
least sustainable. The issue of cross-subsidisation between modernised and unmodernised 
areas should now be closely monitored. 
The ACCC notes that this arrangement may be varied by agreement, and NVIRP has 
indicated publicly that irrigators will be permitted to negotiate exit fees. However, where 
connections programs have not commenced this has not been an option.  
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Currently, as the details of the connections program have not yet been finalised, many 
irrigators are unsure whether connection back will be a viable alternative, as it will force 
irrigators to bear high infrastructure and maintenance costs and to reach negotiated 
positions with multiple irrigators without the statutory scaffolding available to 
authorities. 
5. Conclusions 
The political arguments through which the contraction of infrastructure has been made 
more palatable have been arguments for ‘modernisation’, efficiency, and the return of water 
to the environment. These have been most compelling during periods of water scarcity, and 
have been utilised to ensure that the grave political consequences of the failure of urban 
infrastructure have not eventuated. The processes through which modernisation have 
occurred have had the effect of privatising significant portions of infrastructure and 
transferring risk from the state to an individual or group of individuals.  
There are significant risks in forwarding this strategy for regions. The increasing costs of 
maintaining a water supply, along with the potential to trade water to alleviate those costs, 
result in more and more water leaving irrigation districts. Since land with water produces 
more and can support greater numbers of people, the consequence of water leaving land 
tends to be an overall reduction in the economic wealth of the community and a reduction 
in the number of people in that community. 
However, 
The distribution effects of water trade depend on whether the people who sell the water 
stay in the region and whether they invest outside the region. The effects will also 
depend on whether those purchasing temporary allocations are doing so to offset their 
sale of entitlements, or whether those irrigators selling entitlements are different to 
those who are purchasing allocations. 
The overall trend across GMW’s main irrigation districts was a decline in the number of 
people employed in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing … by 5% between 1996 - 2001. 
(DSE, 2008). 
The decline in rural populations is frequently considered to be an inevitable consequence of 
the economic conditions in first world countries, and concerns about food security  
(for instance, O’Grady 2011; Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Brown and Funk 2008),  
are alleviated by the argument that modern farming conditions, being more efficient, 
require fewer participants (c/f Altieri and Rosset, 2002). However, the consequence of  
the contraction of irrigation is an exacerbation of loss of population by a loss of 
infrastructure. This is a removal of both the industry and the capacity for the industry to 
continue.  
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